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BIOLOGICAL TRUTHS AND LEGAL FICTIONS
R. ALTA CHARo, J.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
When scandal broke out in January 1998 over an alleged affair
between President Clinton and a White House intern, Slate magazine
began speculating as to the causes of presidential misbehavior.'
Among possible explanations was a sociobiological rumination, to wit,
that presidents are alpha-males who are evolutionarily selected for
their propensity to engage in promiscuous sex and to father many
offspring. In furtherance of this theory, Slate re-ran a 1996 campaign
piece on this idea:
Consider the extreme thirst for status and power found
in male [H] omo sapiens in general and Clinton and Dole in
particular. According to evolutionary psychologists, this
thirst exists because during evolution, it led to lots of off-
spring. Those of our male ancestors who most doggedly
climbed to the top of the local status hierarchy were often
rewarded with sex partners-either multiple wives (the Dole
approach) or multiple lovers (the Clinton approach). Hence
* Professor, Law & Medical Ethics, University of Wisconsin. The author wishes to
acknowledge the helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper made by Robert Ar-
nold, Pamela Bridgewater, Evan Gerstemann, John Kidwell, Neal Komesar, Marc Galanter,
Krista Ralston, Jane Schacter, Renie Schapiro, Alan Weisbard, Daniel Wikler, and Stuart
Youngner.
1. Franklin Foer, Wy Clinton Screws Around (last modified Jan. 31, 1998) <http://
www.slate.com/Gist/98-01-31/Gist.asp>.
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the cruel irony facing Clinton and, to a lesser extent, Dole:
From nature's point of view, a central purpose of pursuing
status is to convert it into sex. Yet, demonstrated success in
making this conversion is now deemed a disadvantage in the
quest for the highest-status slot in the world.2
The article continued, with the implication that modern morality is at
odds with biological reality, and that the morality ought, therefore, to
change.
This sort of normative use of biology and evolutionary theory is
certainly not new. It is familiar to all in the form of Herbert Spenser's
adoption of "survival of the fittest" as a metaphor for Nineteenth cen-
tury society drawn from Darwinian observations in the Galapagos is-
lands, and, more recently, set off a spate of controversy with the 1970s
publication of Edward Wilson's book Sociobiology.3 In its latest incarna-
tion, evolutionary psychology, we are returned to discussions about
how the biological realities of our physiology and the evolutionary
processes by which that physiology came into being argues for a sys-
tem of morality that accords with biological compulsions, both be-
cause it is futile to resist these impulses and because evolution has
shown these to be preferred ways of being.4
Law is certainly not immune to these influences, and through the
years case law and legislative enactments have frequently embodied
2. To support this rumination, Slate "recycled" an August 30, 1996 column by Robert
Wright. See Robert Wright, Clinton philandered; Dole left his wife. Who's the worse "character"?
(last modified Sept. 13, 1997) <http://www.slate.com/Earthling/96-08-30/Earthling.asp>.
3. EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1980).
4. See, e.g., THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF
CULTURE (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992); THE COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ADAP-
TIVE SKILLS: EVOLUTIONARY IMPLICATIONS (Eugene S. Gollin, eds., 1985); EVOLUTIONARY
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Jeffrey A. Simpson ed., 1996); KALMAN GLANTz &JOHN PEARCE, EXILES
FROM EDEN: PSYCHOTHERAPY FROM AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE (1989); BEN GOERTZEL,
FROM COMPLEXITY TO CREATITY EXPLORATIONS IN EVOLUTIONARY, AUTOPOIETIC, AND COG-
NITIrE DYNA-MICS (1997); HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND AP-
PLICATIONS (Charles Crawford & Dennis Krebs eds., 1997); SAM KASH KACHIGAN, THE
SEXUAL MATRIX: BoY MEETS GIRL ON THE EVOLUTIONARY SCALE (1996); KENNETH MAXWELL,
THE SEX IMPERATIVE: AN EVOLUTIONARY TALE OF SEXUAL SURVIVAL (1994); THEODORE MIL-
LON, TOWARD A NEW PERSONOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL (1990); PAUL QUINNETT,
DARWIN'S BASS: THE EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF FISHING MAN (1996); ROBERTJ. RICH-
ARDS, DARWIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR (Sci-
ence and Its Conceptual Foundations ed., 1987); MAr RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE:
HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1997); WILLIAM A. ROTTSCHAEFER,
THE BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL AGENCY (1998); SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLU-
TIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996);
ANTHON Y STEVENS & JOHN PRICE, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHIATRY: A NEW BEGINNING (1996);
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (1995).
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assumptions about the biological underpinnings of human behavior,
and imbued those underpinnings with a normative value, that is, as-
sumed that if nature had created certain predilections then there
must be a good reason for this phenomenon, and it should be en-
couraged by the law.
But while the promise and pitfalls of incorporating sociobiology
into explicitly normative rules governing everything from justifiable
homicide to differential employment opportunities for men and wo-
men may be clear, it is worth noting tnat law's uneasy reliance on
biology goes even deeper than this. It goes to the very definitions and
classifications by which the world is understood. Since classifications
exist precisely so that we may differentiate among people and things,
and thereby permit differential treatment of those in differing catego-
ries, the use of biological definitions in law has profound conse-
quences. By appealing to the apparent clarity and physical
permanency of biological notions of life and death, male and female,
mother and father, law constrains itself. Instead of asking what sort of
social arrangements should constitute a "family" for which "family
law" will apply, it begins by asking what sort of biological arrange-
ments constitute a family. Absent an overwhelming problem with this
classification, law contentedly yields the definitional terrain to science.
Of course, those who struggle with a definition of death, or a defi-
nition of motherhood, may feel compelled to make their work consis-
tent with known biological facts. Consistency between a rule of law
and an underlying reality seems, after all, not only intellectually hon-
est but also necessary to ensure public acceptance of the new rules.
But this is not necessarily the case.
There are many examples in which the public has become com-
fortable with rules based on treating people or things as if they really
met the criteria for an underlying biological reality. One category of
such examples encompasses situations where the public is fully com-
plicit in an outright fiction, as the rules define people as things that
biology shows they definitely are not. A fine example is treating adop-
tive parents in all respects as if they were their child's biological par-
ents.5 What may determine public acceptance of such fictions is the
degree to which they protect the current interests of parties affected
by the problem at hand. Adoptive parents are granted a status
equivalent to that of biological parents provided that the biological
parents voluntarily relinquished their legal ties to the child with full
understanding of the consequences and adequate time for reflection
5. See infra discussion accompanying notes 28-30.
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prior to making a definitive decision.6
A second category of such examples includes situations where
there is a belief that there is a biological truth about the classification
of a person, but that this truth is, at least for the moment, unknow-
able. A good example is declaring absent people dead after a suffi-
cient passage of time.7 "Missing and treated as if dead" is well
accepted provided that some provision is made for future events, for
example, ameliorating the effects of an erroneous declaration by cre-
ating a fund to compensate a long-lost person who reappears to find
her assets were distributed to her heirs. In addition, the public may
well be wary of the fiction if it is not necessitated by a demonstrable
problem, such as the need to settle title to property or regularize mari-
tal status. Where such problems could be addressed by other means
(e.g., by eliminating the notion of "ownership" in property law or end-
ing current restrictions on bigamy), public acceptance of the fiction
will depend upon a credible argument that the fiction provides the
best solution.8
A third category of examples, and one that may well leave the
public most distrustful of legal fictions, includes those where the bio-
logical truth is uncertain because the biological categories themselves
are unclear. The definitions of "life" and "sex" fall into this sphere.9
Since neither term has a clear meaning in biology, the task of choos-
ing one biological definition over all others necessarily entails resort
to a second order of analysis. Usually this means an effort to examine
the purposes for which the definition is being written, and then exam-
ining the available biological definitions to determine which one best
serves the public policy purposes for its use. Thus, debate over when
human life begins tends to arise when discussing abortion, and the
choice of definitions will incorporate consideration of whether the
purpose is to prevent destruction (in which case a broad definition
will be adopted) or to facilitate citizens' free activities (in which case a
narrow definition will be adopted)."a Similarly, the controversy over
defining "female" for the purposes of eligibility on Olympic women's
teams has persisted without resolution due to a lack of consensus over
why one divides athletes into teams by sex. Delineation between
"male" and "female" becomes blurred in persons with chromosomal
structures that lead to outward appearances at odds with genetic defi-
6. See id.
7. See infra discussion accompanying notes 34-45.
8. See id.
9. See infra discussion accompanying notes 46-83.
10. See infra discussion accompanying notes 46-57.
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nitions." Although such persons are socially defined as one gender,
they may have latent physical attributes of the other, leading to almost
surrealistic debates over proper placement in athletic competitions.12
Finally, there are cases in which there isn't any biological truth at
all, but the impression that a biological truth exists is being used to
create legal categories that are beyond judges and voters to alter, thus
lending a sense of inevitability to the legal categories and any conse-
quences that flow therefrom. The current debate swirling around the
use of "race" as a classifier for American citizens, and the number of
race categories from which to choose, is a leading example. Defini-
tions of race become bogged down in extended discussion of self-
identification versus biological definition when it comes to distribut-
ing certain social goods, such as eligibility for compensatory payments
in the case of Native Americans.'
3
The use of legal fictions is one way to manage the problem of
discordance between the social rules we need and the biological truths
we perceive. But it tends to lead to tortured decision-making precisely
because law and lawyers forget that there is no need to constrain legal
and social imagination. This reminder is made even more urgent by
the growing interest in the biology of genetics, in particular. In some
ways best understood as a form of fortune-telling, genetic analysis may
well become the most potent form of biological determinism 14 and
thus the most potent force in the development of future legal fictions.
This article documents just a few of these legal fictions, and notes
those conditions that make them tolerable. A better solution, how-
ever, might be found in a more explicit recognition that biological
classifications are but one factor in defining social classifications and
the rules that apply to them.
II. CATEGORY ONE: EVERYONE KNOWS IT'S A FICTION
The blood ties between parent and child have almost mythologi-
11. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv.
187 (1988).
12. See Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection: Performance Enhancement and the
Control of Attributes, 65 So. CAL. L. REV. 11 (1991); see generally Shelley Page, Who is Female
and How Do You Know? O-rAWA CITIZEN, July 19, 1992, at El.
13. See generally Steven Platzman, Objects of Controversy: The Native American Right to Repa-
triation, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 517 (1992); Kevin L. Kelly & Melinda A. Maxwell, Native Right:
Native Americans, 22 ENvTL. L. 1225 (1992).
14. See generally RIcHARD C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA
(1993).
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cal significance in every culture, 15 representing both the act of procre-
ation and the physical reflection of the parent's body in the body of
the child. 6 "[I]t is only natural," states one commentator, "that our
sublime and complex feelings regarding this issue reflect precisely the
sentiment that law should preserve as a family unit that which nature
has rendered genetically similar." 7
The biological model of the family, with its overlay of insistence
upon expressing biological relationships within a socially sanctioned,
heterosexual marriage," has resulted in the creation of a grand pre-
sumption, to wit, that all "real" families follow a biological model of
one male and one female parent. No third party can gain a perma-
nent, legally recognized relationship with a child absent an extraordi-
nary intervention by the law or the permanent withdrawal of the
natural parents from the child's life. These biological, or real, parents
are given an almost unbeatable presumption in their favor when it
comes to contested custody and parenting cases. When supplanted by
non-biological parents, they are made to disappear in order to re-cre-
ate the illusion of a biological family. 9
At the same time, though, this seeming fascination with biology
has had a strong competitor - the need to find substitute parents
when genetic linkages were missing or inconvenient. Adoption, a
statutory creation not existing at common law,2 0 though long taking
15. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 13-30 (1978).
16. See id. at 202-03; see also ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 55-72
(1978). The importance of genetic ties is confirmed by research suggesting that many
psychological attributes may also be influenced by genetic heritage, although environmen-
tal influences may swamp these effects. Compare EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE
20-25 (1978); RICHARD C. LEWONTIN ET AL., New Biology Versus Old Ideology in NOT IN OUR
GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE 265 (1984).
17. John L. Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 390 (1991). The emotional significance of that bio-
logical link became enshrined in religious traditions that grappled with death and the
finiteness of humankind. See, e.g., ROBERTJ. LIFTON, THE LIFE OF THE SELF 32 (1983). For
example, many cultures and religious traditions, such as Judaism, hold that there is no
formal "afterlife." See id. Rather, we live on through our children, a kind of limited, ge-
netic immortality. See id. Their memories of us continue our existence. See id. And when
the memories fail, a small part of ourselves, our genes and our traits, still persist. See id. It
is no coincidence, then, thatJewish tradition dictates that a man marry his brother's widow
if the brother should die childless. See Deuteronomy 25:3-10. To do less would be to allow
the brother's genes to go untransmitted, surely condemning him to true death.
18. See R. Alta Charo, Biological Determinism in Legal Decisionmaking: The Parent Trap 3
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 265-307 (1994).
19. See generally MARILYN STRATHERN, REPRODUCING THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON ANTHROPOL-
OGY, KINSHIP, AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1992).
20. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977).
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place informally or with private legislation,21 is evidence of a strong
social tradition that recognizes the purely social and psychological
dimensions of parenting, even where these occur in the absence of
biological ties.22 Yet even with adoption, adoptive parents may ac-
quire parental status with respect to a particular child only after termi-
nation of the parental rights of the child's biological parents,
particularly those of the natural mother. The presumption of biology
serves as an irrebuttable legal presumption that the birth mother of
the child is its legal mother and that adoption can take place only
consequent to a termination of the parental rights of the birth
mother.23
In the United States, adoption began as a means for privatizing
the cost of maintaining orphans.2 4 Although some attention was paid
to the child's well-being, placement mainly served to privatize the cost
of the child's education and care, while providing inexpensive labor
to the adults taking in the child.2" It only later became grounded in
child welfare, and that welfare was generally defined as re-creation of
a biological-style family unit for the child to enter.26 Adoption statutes
21. See IrvingJ. Sloan, The Law of Adoption and Surrogate parenting 5-11 (1988).
22. In early Rome and in other ancient cultures, adoption served a primarily religious
function associated with ensuring a legitimate male heir to carry out sacred obligations. Id.
at 5-7. Even after the religious overtones vanished, civil law countries viewed adoption
principally as a vehicle for perpetuating the adoptive parent's name and property rather
than as a means of benefitting the adoptee. See e.g., Stephan B. Presser, The Historical
Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971); Fred L. Kuhlman,
Intestate Succession By and from the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U. L.Q. 221 (1943); Leo Albert
Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. Rsv. 743, 745 (1956). The
English common law did not recognize adoption at all; England finally legalized it by stat-
ute in 1926. See The Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29. (Eng.). A
more cynical explanation, therefore, of the romanticization of genetic linkages between
father and child, and the degree to which adoption is structured to re-create families with
clear lines of succession from a single father, rests on the needs of men to conserve their
property for the benefit of only a few children, those to whom they are truly related by
blood and whom they have, in a sense, contracted to sire. See Presser, supra.
23. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: Should the Adoption Model Apply , 7
Children's Legal Rts.J. 13 (1986). See generally PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A
SOCIAL HIS TORY OF FAMILY LIFE (1962).
24. By the nineteenth century, the economic atmosphere tempted many adoptive par-
ents to take advantage of a child's labor without returning much by way of education and
succor. See, e.g., Homer Folks, The Care of Destitute, Neglected, and Delinquent Children
64-65 (1902). See generally Presser, supra note 22.
25. Barbara Laslett, The Family as a Public and Private Institution, in INTTIACY, FAMILY,
AND SOCIETv 94 (Skolnick & Skolnick eds., 1974).
26. Although Americans have always farmed out children in some fashion, adoption as
known today did not fully emerge until the mid-nineteenth century when general adoption
legislation was introduced on a wave of social welfare reform. Before then child placement
in this country was an informal affair. See generally, Laslett, supra note 25, at 101-03. Upon
the death of one or both parents, a child was simply "put-out" for a suitable blood relative,
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soon followed suit, reflecting a slow shift in public attitudes from the
notions of apprenticeship and service to the notion that child place-
ment should primarily serve the welfare of the dependent child.
Modern adoption statutes are replete with statements that make
it clear that the primary focus of today's adoption laws is the well-
being of the adopted child. 7 In the case of the out-of-wedlock infant
given to strangers for adoption, society generally deems it in the
adoptee's best interests to make him a full-fledged member of his
adoptive family, as though he had been born into his adoptive
family.2"
Thus, once created by statute, adoption was designed to use law
to re-create the image of the biological family unit. It required that
the biological parents be permanently removed from the child's life
and the adoptive parents substituted for them,2" a policy that would
be followed in the 1990s by the permanent removal of inconvenient
genetic or gestational parents. It was not possible for the child to be
adopted without the natural parents relinquishing all parental rights
and responsibilities. Under law, they became legal strangers. °
The tragic stories of Baby Jessica,3 t Kimberly Mays, 2 and Baby
usually designated in the decedent's will, to raise. Orphaned or abandoned children with-
out family connection and too young for apprenticeship went to public facilities until they
were useful enough to be either "bound-out" (indentured or apprenticed) or sent to
uninvestigated homes. See, ARTHUR W. CALHOUN, 1 A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 296-98 (1917). Christian reformers, through religiously affiliated private agencies,
began to shift the focus of their efforts toward the placement of infants and young children
in homes where they would be treated more like family members than servants. See
Presser, supra note 23, at 482-88, as cited in Lisa A. Fuller, Intestate Succession Rights of the
Adopted Child: Should the Stepparent Adoption be Extended? 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1188, 1192
(1992).
27. The requirement of many modern adoption statutes that prospective adoptive par-
ents pass a rigorous screening process before the adoption is finalized illustrates this con-
cern. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
INFERTILTy: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES (1988). [hereinafter OTA 1988].
28. Furthermore, it is widely believed that an adoptee's retention of ties with his bio-
logical family can undermine the psychological aspect of this assimilation. See e.g.,
Crumpton v. Mitchell, 281 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. 1981). Thus, courts have described adoption
statutes as "giving the adopted child a 'fresh start' by treating him as the natural child of
the adoptive parent," In Re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wash. 1972), and in
essence a "substitution of the adoptive in place of the natural family and severance of legal
ties with the child's natural family." Crumpton, 281 S.E.2d at 6.
29. See Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 925, 925 (1991)
(employing a constitutional analysis of the changing nature of families in a time of increas-
ing challenges to civil liberties).
30. JOHN T. DEMPSEY, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY. THE ISSUE OF THE 1980's (1981).
31. BabyJessica, relinquished at birth by her biological mother and a man incorrectly
acting as her biological father, was placed with prospective adoptive parents in another
state. See Carol McHugh, Adoption Contests Not Common - But Risks Are, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
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Pete,33 which captivated the American public in 1993, demonstrate
beyond question that such simplistic and reductionist approaches fail
to capture the emotional complications and the public attitudes to-
ward parenting. In those three cases, a child ended up with her bio-
logical parents (Jessica), rearing parent (Kimberly), and both (Pete),
thus demonstrating that the legal fiction of the adoptive family as a
biological unit cannot be sustained when the legal procedures fail to
protect the interests of those whose biological realities are being
denied.
These three cases tested the sympathies of the American public,
which wavered wildly among preferring biology over adoption, inten-
tion over genetics, and happiness over everything. They demon-
strated that the law's attempt to make biology (genetics and gestation)
and contract (adoption and surrogacy) yield to public policy (hetero-
sexual, marital families that resemble biological families in the wild) is
flawed, because no one of these factors can easily and consistently out-
weigh all the others.
But the most consistent thread that ran through all these stories
Aug. 30, 1993, at 3. Very soon thereafter, the birth mother revoked her consent, and the
correctly identified biological father refused his consent. See id. After a tortured two year
legal battle, Baby Jessica was returned to her birth parents, now married to one another,
while her rearing parents sobbed. See id. They had been portrayed as having superior
parenting skills and offering a better chance for a happy home for the child. See id. But
the rapidity with which the birth mother revoked her consent, the absence of consent from
a correctly identified biological father, and the indisputable biological linkage to the birth
mother and her husband militated against leavingJessica with the rearing parents. See id.
Indeed, many commentators opined that the real tragedy here was that the case was not
resolved eighteen months earlier. See id.
32. Kimberly Mays, on the other hand, successfully halted all contact with her biologi-
cal parents, despite their never having consented to her relinquishment. See Hank Grezlak,
Family Law Attorneys Split Over Decision In Mays Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 20, 1993, at
1. Mays was switched at birth with another infant, and her biological parents, the Twiggs,
reared the other girl, who died in her childhood from a congenital heart defect. See id.
Medical treatment for the girl revealed that she could not be the biological daughter of the
Twiggs, and after her death, these parents tracked down the Mays family as those who had
gone home with their biological daughter. See id. Following a tense period of visitation by
Kimberly with her biological family, her rearing father requested a temporary end to her
contact with the Twiggs. See id. The Twiggs sought a recognition of their legal status as
Kimberly's parents, and Kimberly sought a court order to sever all ties to the Twiggs. See id.
A Florida court granted Kimberly her requested relief. See id.
33. Baby Pete was relinquished at birth by his birth mother and an incorrectly identi-
fied genetic father. SeeJudith Gaines, Unique Adoption Ruling; Both Sides Cheer Settlement That
Shares Vt. Boy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1993, at 1. The court, with acquiescence of the
parties, declared the genetic father to be the legal father, with visitation rights and support
responsibilities. See id. It terminated the parental rights of the birth mother, as per her
wishes, and declared the rearing mother to be the adoptive, legal, and custodial mother of
the child. See id. Of course, as one father was already in the picture, the rearing father was
granted no status other than that of a step-parent. See id.
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was that a legal fiction would not be comfortably sustained unless: (1)
it is necessary to achieve a fairly compelling purpose, such as assuring
that a child's best interests are considered (e.g., sympathy for Baby
Jessica's adoptive parents was based in large part on the belief that
Jessica would be far better off remaining with her faux-biological fam-
ily); (2) it actually achieves that purpose (the distress over Kimberly
Mays' situation demonstrated public intolerance for the legal fiction
that Kimberly was the Mays' biological daughter and unrelated to the
Twiggs, as she clearly felt it was in her best interests to explore both
families.) and (3) the cure is not worse than the disease. When adop-
tion fictions work to deny the affected adults a fair opportunity to pro-
tect their own interests, even an adoption that presumably is serving
the child's best interests will be undone. Baby Pete's genetic father,
denied a chance to claim his paternity at Pete's birth, was seen as so
badly injured by the legal fiction that Pete's adoptive parents were his
only parents that the court re-organized the arrangement.
1II. CATEGORY Two: WHEN BIOLOGICAL TRUTHS EXIST BUT CANNOT
BE FOUND
Law considers "absence" as more than being away from one's
home. The absentee has vanished, and it is impossible to tell whether
he is dead or alive. This uncertainty is the hallmark of the absentee:
According to an expression of Tronchet, and as extraordinary as it
may seem, the absentee is neither dead nor alive; in this uncertainty, it
cannot be proven that he is dead nor that he is alive.34 It is, thus,
doubt which prevails.35
The number of these "living dead" in the United States has been
estimated between 60,000 to 100,000 people.3 6 They create a morass
34. See Frances T. Freeman Jalet, Mysterious Disappearance: The Presumption of Death and
the Administration of the Estates of Missing Persons or Absentees, 54 IOwA L. REv. 177, 226-27
(1968) (discussing absentee statutes based on continued life).
35. See id.
36. In 1996, 10,048 people were reported missing in Iowa alone. See Missing Persons,
DES MOINES REG., Feb. 11, 1997, at 10. Nationally, in 1996, "955,252 missing persons
(adults and juveniles) were reported to the police and entered into the [Federal Bureau of
Investigation's] FBI's National Crime Information Center. The FBI estimates that 85 to 90
percent of missing persons are juveniles." Martin Frost, America Cannot Forget About Missing
Children, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 24, 1997, at 15. According to author Jonathan
Coleman, the FBI's computer file on missing persons at the National Crime Information
Center has listed up to 60,000 reported cases of "regular Americans as absent without logi-
cal explanation." Paul Dean, Disappearing Acts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1989, at 1, available in
1989 WrL 2247211. The head of the private missing persons agency, Search, Inc., estimates
that 100,000 adult Americans are missing. See Dean, supra.
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of legal problems,3 7 and ignoring those problems presents an unac-
ceptable burden on those alive and present. Thus, various rules have
developed to govern the management of this phenomenon, attempt-
ing to balance the interests of those with rights contingent upon the
absentee's death with those rights of the absentee himself, should he
still be alive.
The presumption of death based on absence for a period of years
appears in almost all common law states. While historically some re-
lied solely on the common law presumption,3" most states have em-
37. Questions may arise concerning the security of transactions with the missing per-
son's estate, such as the disposition of his land. See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips, 514 So. 2d 338,
341 (Miss. 1987) (holding that reliance on decree of death of absentee by vendees could
prevent return of property on absentee's reappearance); the right to proceeds of insur-
ance policies on his life and pensions, see, e.g., Lord v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 434 So.
2d 1180, 1182 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting application of presumption of death to
award of benefit under life insurance policy); the right to a cause of action, see, e.g., Pierce
v. Gervais, 425 So. 2d 922, 924-25 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (refusing to vacate judgment of
divorce granted to spouse of soldier missing in Vietnam, resulting in denial of military
widow's benefits); 20 C.F.R. § 404.721 (b) (1989) (governing payment of social security sur-
vivors' benefits to spouses of absentees); the necessity of providing for his dependents, see,
e.g., Ledet v. State Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 465 So. 2d 98, 101 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 468 So. 2d 1211 (1985) (holding that plaintiff whose right of action for
wrongful death of sister depended on prior death of absentee mother could rely on pre-
sumption of death based on absence); Germain v. Germain, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (sequestering property and income of missing defendant, appointing spouse as re-
ceiver to use them for her support); the marital status of his spouse and the paternity and
legitimacy of children of his spouse's second marriage, see, e.g., Wells v. Wells, 191 A.2d 763
(N.J. 1963) (upholding validity of plaintiff's marriage to spouse missing for thirty-three
years, and finding second marriage eleven years after spouse disappeared was a nullity);
Stewart v. Rogers, 133 S.E.2d 155 (N.C. 1963) (upholding validity of second marriage, de-
spite failure of absentee's spouse to wait statutory seven years, because absentee disap-
peared in life-endangering circumstances); McCaffrey v. Benson, 38 La. Ann. 198 (1886)
(finding second marriage a nullity because of pre-existing, undissolved marriage to person
who had disappeared); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 80 (West 1993), repealed by 1938 La. Acts
No. 357 (authorizing remarriage of spouse of absentee); Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d
451, 456-57 (La. 1975) (children legitimated by subsequent marriage of their biological
parents, despite possibility that first husband, an absentee, was alive at the time of their
conception and birth); the conservation of his property from possible waste, the release of
property from a life tenancy; see, e.g., Succession of Butier, 166 La. 224 (1928), reh'granted,
117 So. 127 (La. 1928) (succession devolves exclusively on coheirs of absentee); Eagle v.
Emmet, 4 Brad. 117 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1856) (legacy to absentee did not lapse prior to seven
years of absence because facts of disappearance did not suggest death); the
merchantability of land tides from his estate, see, e.g., Saracino v. Kosower Const. Co., 140
A. 458 (NJ. 1928) (plaintiff's title to real property unmerchantable because absentee an-
cestor in title, though presumed dead, might return), and claims of inheritance from him,
see, e.g., Heirs of Wilson v. Smith, 14 La. Ann. 368 (1859) (denying succession rights to real
property of claimants who were unable to identify the absentee owner thereof as the de
cujus); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Deal, 44 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. 1947) (denying claim of
collaterals to trust estate of absentee, who on the evidence was neither presumed dead nor
proven to be without descendants).
38. See, e.g., Cobble v. Royal Neighbors of America, 236 S.W. 306 (Miss. 1921); Karl,
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bodied the presumption in a statute, either individual"9 or adapted
from the Uniform Probate Code.4" The presumption acts as a bright
line; after the requisite time has passed, the absentee is treated as if he
were biologically dead: his will is probated, his marriage is acknowl-
edged as dissolved, and his other rights and responsibilities are
nullified.
The key to the success of the common law and statutory provi-
sions lies in their preservation of remedies in the event of error.
While imperfect, provision for return of some property or compensa-
tion from a public insurance fund operates to guarantee a minimum
degree of fairness to parties erroneously declared dead. The residual
unfairness is tolerated because it is outweighed by the damage caused
to innumerable people who are clearly alive if some sort of scheme for
presuming death were not put in place.
A second area in which law creates presumptions of death con-
cerns the official time to be recorded as the moment of death.41 The
issue takes on importance in the case of accidents in which two people
die so close in time that it is impossible to tell which person died first.
Should there be an issue of inheritance between them, it is important
to know which person survived longer. If the survivor was an heir to
the first person to die, then property would flow from the first person
to die to the survivor, and thence to the survivor's heirs. Since the two
people may have had residuary heirs, figuring out which person died
first would determine which residuary heirs to the respective dece-
dents would stand to inherit the estates. In the absence of evidence of
survivorship, however, the lack of certainty could lead to interminable
delays in probating the estates, and prevent the transmission of the
property to those still alive and capable of putting it to profitable use.
Drechsler, Comment, Absentee's Property Act, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 282-83 (1942) (discussing
Wisconsin's non-statutory common law presumption). See In re Will of Menzel v. North-
western Nat'l Bank, 77 N.W. 2d 833 (Minn. 1956) (discussing-the use of Wisconsin's non-
statutory common law presumption). See generally 22 Am. Jur. 2d Death § 551 (1996).
39. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-40-105 (Michie 1987); CAL. Evi. CODE § 667 (West
1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-2-5-1 (West 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-23 (West 1972).
40. In 1939, the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws approved a model law on this point, but by 1957 only three
states had adopted it. See Haynes v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 277 A.2d 251, 254 (Md. 1971).
The Uniform Probate Code provides for a presumption of death after five years' absence.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-107(3), 8 U.LA. 28 (1987). However, the time period has
been changed in some of the states that have adopted the code section. Some states have
returned to the traditional seven years; see, eg., N.D. CENr. CODE § 31-11-04 (Michie 1997).
Minnesota has shortened the period to four years. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-107(3),
576.141 (West 1997).
41. See generally, Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2042 (West 1998); FED R. CIv P.
17; DuRoure v. Alvord 120 F. Supp. 166 (1954).
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For the purpose of facilitating the orderly transfer of property
from owner to heir in these cases, many states have enacted a simulta-
neous-death statute.4" As with absentees, the law creates a new pre-
sumption, here that the people died in the same instant. This will be
the basis on which property is distributed unless someone can prove
that one of them probably survived the other.4 3 Unlike the absentee
presumption, however, the presumption does not operate by taking a
particular fact, such as absence of seven years, and then declaring that
this fact alone is enough to constitute proof that a person is probably
dead. Here, no best guess of the order of deaths is made. Instead, a
wholly new, and quite unlikely, version of biological reality is adopted
as presumptively true absent good evidence to the contrary. In this
sense, the simultaneous death statutes are creating presumptions of
law, not simply setting forth permissible inferences of fact from clues
like extended absence.
That these -statutes represent presumptions of law rather than in-
ferences (or presumptions of fact) is made abundantly clear by the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which introduced a revised rule that
persons killed in a common accident are presumed to have died at the
same instant unless someone proves that one of them probably sur-
vived at least 120 hours longer than the other.44 Thus, under the
UPC, where one person is declared dead at the scene, and the other
arrives alive at the emergency room but dies soon thereafter, property
from the person dead on the scene does not go to the person dead in
the emergency room, and thence to the heirs of the person in the
emergency room. Instead, the heirs of both share the estates, as they
would had these two actually died simultaneously. 45
One reason such a presumption of law is tolerated is that the
competing interests are both socially constructed. The purpose for
noting the order of deaths is to facilitate invoking inheritance laws.
Where determining this fact is too unwieldy to facilitate probate, or
where facilitating probate seems pointless because the survivor did not
live long enough to enjoy the inheritance, the law simply declines to
use the general rule.
Indeed, the law need not have used the fiction of simultaneous
death at all - it could have been written to simply say that the order of
deaths doesn't apply when it can't be determined or when to do so
42. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981 ch. 110 1/2; IDAHO CODE § 15-2-601 (1997).
43. See, e.g., UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH AcT (amended 1991), 8A U.L.A. 557 (Supp.
1992).
44. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104, 2-601 (West 1998).
45. See id.
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does not further the purposes of probate law. But by pretending that
the deaths really were biologically simultaneous, there is no need to
write myriad special provisions throughout federal and state codes.
Instead, existing codes can be used, and the simultaneous times of
death neatly plugged into existing formulae. This is very much like
adoption, where the legal (albeit not psychological) fiction of kinship
permits a global change in the adoptees' civil status.
IV. CATEGORY THREE: CONFUSIONS INHERENT IN BIOLOGY
A. Whose Life is It, Anyway?
Notions of human "life" suffer from a lack of clarity within biol-
ogy itself as to its definition and its objective measurement. The most
common situation in which the dilemma arises is in the attempt to
identify when developing forms of human life, such as gametes, em-
bryos, fetuses, and newborns, are entitled to the same basic human
rights that are automatically applied to children and adults. The solu-
tions are most often applied, as in the area of death, when disputes
arise concerning the rights of accepted members of the moral com-
munity to take actions that will affect the physical state of the disputed
members' bodies. Abortion, which destroys disputed members' bod-
ies, is but the most vivid example. With so little agreement about the
characterization of the accepted members' actions (moral vs. im-
moral, strongly vs. weakly protected by legal rights), advocates from all
sides often resort to reliance on claims that biological reality in the
area is clear and singular, and that this reality leads ineluctably to a
single solution to the policy debate.
It is perhaps no surprise that the field of reproductive law and
policy is drowning in several fundamental misconceptions:4 6 first, that
there is a single, accepted biological answer to the question "when
does human life begin?;"4 7 second, that moral philosophy universally
holds that human rights attach to any and all types of human life; and
third, that law is obligated to hold that legal rights attach to any entity
that is biologically human and alive or that is accepted by moral phi-
losophy as the possessor of human rights.4"
Like the process of dying, the process of conception and birth
46. For a rehearsal of all these arguments, see e.g. Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of
the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1991).
47. See, e.g., S. 2135, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (stating that Congress "finds that
the life of each human being begins at fertilization").
48. See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 182 (1995), as cited in Jason F. Robin-
son, Book Review, Gerber's To Secure These Rights, 12J.L. & PoL. 123, 124-30 (1996).
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has no single moment at which an entity becomes a living human be-
ing. Rather, living cells with human genetic material become progres-
sively more intertwined, then begin multiplying and differentiating,
and finally become physiological systems capable of sustained exist-
ence outside the uterine environment. This process of development
offers many developmental markers, but none, in and of themselves,
satisfy the philosophical and legal question of when society must (or
even ought to) embrace the entity as a full member of its community.
Different cultures feel bound to recognize the full range of human
rights in such entities at times as different as fertilization or 30 days
following birth.4"
Nonetheless, American law has historically looked to biology to
determine the time at which to initiate legal standing. Live birth was
long the initial prerequisite for conferral of legal standing 50 because it
provided the simplest bright line rule and the most obvious time at
which to recognize the existence of a new entity as a legal person.51
The live birth rule did not purport to characterize the fetus as any-
thing in particular, (e.g., property, potential child). The rule merely
said what the fetus was not, (i.e., it was not a person with legal stand-
ing to sue or be sued).
Once fetal independence and integration were recognized, the
point at which the biological paradigm conferred legal standing was
revised.52 But as technology advanced, medical practitioners discov-
ered that fetuses became capable of independent integrated function-
ing in utero at the so-called "moment of viability. ' 53 Consistent with a
position that all human bodies capable of independent integrated
functioning (even if they currently were not, in fact, independent of
the mother's womb) receive legal standing, the courts were forced to
abandon the live birth rule because the point at which the criteria for
49. For example, under some circumstances, OrthodoxJudaism does not acknowledge
personhood until thirty days after birth. See DAVID FELDMAN, MARITAL RELATIONS, BIRTH
CONTROL AND ABORTION IN JEWISH LAw 253 (1974), as cited in Barbara Gregoratos, Tempest
in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
977, 986 (1986).
50. See RosCoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 384-94 (1959).
51. See Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the
Unborn, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1647, 1657-59 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
53. Mary Ellen Avery, Editorial: Considerations on the Definition of Viability, 292 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 206, 206 (1975) (identifying that any definition or modus operandi agreed upon at
one point in time would change within the next year but also recognizing that to answer
the question of viability of a human fetus depends on deciding at what point to treat "the
product of conception" as any piece of tissue removed at operation or when to "mobilize
the facilities of a neonatal intensive-care unit to promote a small possibility of survival").
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legal standing were satisfied preceded birth. Starting with Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 54 a flurry of cases were decided applying the new biological
bright line, most often to confer legal standing upon viable fetuses to
sue (after birth) for prenatal injuries inflicted after viability. 55
Justice Blackmun's decision in Roe v. Wade56 appeared to settle
remaining issues concerning the legal standing of fetuses, but closer
examination reveals that it merely settled the status of fetus vis-a-vis a
competing interest on the part of a woman to terminate her preg-
nancy.57 The Court simplified this balancing process considerably
when it declared that, based on historical analysis, the Constitution
and its amendments were drafted without any thought that the phrase
"person" would encompass fetuses. Thus, fetuses would not be con-
sidered legal "persons" for the purpose of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments (which direct the federal and state governments, respec-
tively, to ensure due process and equal protection of the law to all
persons). As pregnant women are legal "persons" for the purposes of
these amendments, their rights would nearly always be protected,
even at the expense of any rights states choose to grant to fetuses.
The word "person" is used as a term of art in law to signify an
entity granted equal protection of the law. The term is not co-exten-
sive with the biological concept of "a live human;" corporations can be
persons while fetuses or antebellum slaves are not. But the intuition
that legal persons ought to be co-extensive with biological persons
stems from the larger intuition that the legal system ought to be co-
extensive with physical reality.
Unfortunately, as with the case of "gender," biology cannot neatly
define the term "person." While biology can define "human," it can-
not define "personhood" solely in terms of physical characteristics.
For example, to define all living cells with a human genome - such
as a fertilized egg - as a person would define every living cell in our
skin, kidneys and other organs as a person as well. Thus, some philo-
sophical inquiry into the purpose for dividing live human cells as "per-
54. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding that a child which was injured in the pro-
cess of removal from its mother's womb was a viable child with standing in court to main-
tain action for its injury and thus child could not be denied recovery on ground that it was
merely a part of its mother).
55. See e.g., Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222
(1971); Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Right of Child to Action Against Mother for Infliction
of Prenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R.4th 1082 (1990); Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to
Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978).
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. See generally id.
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sons" or "non-persons" is required in order to use what biological
information is available.
B. She, He, and What?
Perhaps nothing seems so basic as our notions of who is a girl and
who is a boy. But, in fact, ambiguities about biological definitions of
sex are another example of an area in which genuine ambiguities in
biological definitions themselves undermine the task of making rules.
Here, however, even a willingness to go beyond what is intuitive can
fail to achieve acceptable public policy if the purposes of the rule are
inadequately articulated and the technical implementation of the
nuanced rule has substantial room for error.
Some of the best examples come from the world of sports. Gen-
der tests were first introduced to the Olympics in 1966 to prevent men
from seeking an advantage by competing as women.51 "The Press sis-
ters from the Soviet Union, Irina, a pentathlete and hurdler, and
Tamara, a shot putter and discus thrower, won five Olympic gold med-
als and one silver in 1960 and 1964 amid suspicions about their sexu-
ality."59 When gender testing began in 1966, they retired, arousing
more suspicions." Similar stories developed over the years, and,
more recently, a Filipina sprinter billed as Asia's next track queen was
forced to publicly proclaim she is indeed female even though medical
tests have so far shown she is genetically male. 6
58. Because of the obvious advantages in strength and size of men over women it has
long been accepted that the two sexes should compete in separate competitions. See Gail
Vines, Last Olympics for the Sex Test? 135 Naw SCIENTiST 39 (1992). During the 1960s, when
women began hard physical training, and perhaps because of the advent of misuse of ana-
bolic steroids, there were increasing concerns regarding the sexuality of some female ath-
letes. See id. at 39-40. It was decided by the major sporting organizations that all women
should undergo "gender verification" to prove their femininity. See id. at 39.
The first attempt at sex testing by the International Amateur Athletic Federation
in 1966 involved the parade of naked female athletes before a panel of male doc-
tors. Fortunately this was immediately replaced by the International Olympic
Committee with the buccal smear test for the Barr body (X chromatin). At the
Barcelona Games in 1992 the Barr test was replaced by the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) test, which detects the presence of the Y chromosome. The buc-
cal smear is minimally invasive, is inoffensive, and gives rapid results. It does not,
however, detect women abnormally virilised by such conditions as congenital ad-
renal hyperplasia, but it does show the chromosomal abnormality (XY) of pheno-
typic women with testicular feminisation. The latter undergo physical
examination to assess their phenotype and are allowed to compete in Olympic
competition.
Roslyn Carbon, Female Athletes: ABC of Sports Medicine, 309 BIOT. MED. J. 254, 255 (1994).
59. See Olympic Weekly, ATLANTA CONST., July 28, 1995, at G2.
60. See id.
61. See Karen Allen, Gender in Question, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 1996, at 3C, available in
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Indeed, the phenomenally rapid rise of the Chinese women ath-
letes at the Barcelona Olympics resulted in allegations that they must
be males, and was the impetus for much of the testing at the Asian
games. 62 Many observers, particularly feminists, were outraged that
rapid achievement in sports was viewed by so many sports organizers
as beyond the spectrum of "normal" female capacities, especially since
Olympic level athletes of either sex are likely to be outliers in terms of
both genetic and environmental predisposition to excellence in physi-
cal activities.
The most common explanation for the interest in sex testing is to
prevent males from competing as women, on the assumption that
males have a general advantage in strength and fatty-lean tissue ratios.
But there are more than a dozen conditions, known as intersex states,
in which there may be a mixing of male and female traits; some give
such disputed-women some advantage in sports, others cause a disad-
vantage. 6 3 It depends on what type of hormones they're producing,
what kinds of effects these hormones have on the body, and whether
success at a particular sport depends upon such effects.64
Although techniques for gender testing have evolved over time to
take advantage of new technologies, athletic federations as well as
some physicians say the testing is unreliable, unnecessary, and unfair
to women, who may be ridiculed and wrongly disqualified because of
the results. Early testing regimes consisted of phenotypic examina-
tion, often requiring women athletes to parade nude before a panel of
gynecologists so that genital examination could be performed.65
Chromosome testing by blood sampling was hailed as a major ad-
vance, and the subsequent introduction of buccal sampling and
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was considered the crowning
achievement in subtle, relatively non-invasive testing.66
Chromosome testing, though usually accurate for the purpose of
classifying people as genetically male or female according to genetic
definitions and conventions, does not necessarily identify people who
1996 WL 2047897; Eric Garwood, He Said, She Said: Gender Questioned, FLA. TODAY, Feb. 21,
1996, at 2C, available in 1996 WrL 10048997.
62. See Mike Fish, Superpower Obsession, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTIONAL, Apr. 17, 1994, at
A8.
63. See Vines, supra note 58, at 40-42; See also A. Carlson, When is a Woman Not a Woman?
13 WOMEN'S SPORTS & FITNESS 24 (1991).
64. See Vines, supra note 58, at 40-42.
65. See Carbon, supra note 58, at 255.
66. Buccal smears for cell samples are certainly less psychically invasive, although techni-
cally they are more physically invasive than the earlier gynecological parades. See Vines,
supra note 58, at 40; Carbon, supra note 58, at 255.
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are hormonally or genitally at odds with their chromosomal inheri-
tance. Since "gender" is commonly understood to embody more than
an intrinsic indicator of genetic sex,67 but also self-identification with
either men or women as well as ascribed identification, chromosome
testing cannot necessarily serve to sort the population into "men" and
"women."68
Although seemingly an improvement, unfortunately PCR testing
is so sensitive that lab error rates can exceed that for the more primi-
tive forms of chromosomal testing; even a small number of a male
technician's own shedding skin cells can contaminate the sample
under testing.69 It has been reported that four to six athletes have
been disqualified or have dropped out of each Olympiad since 1968
because of the chromosome tests while only seven cases of 'Justifiable"
exclusion have been confirmed.7 ° And while the International Ama-
teur Athletic Federation (IAAF) stopped testing female athletes in
1992, after they concluded chromosome testing was inconclusive and
scientifically inaccurate in determining the sex of an athlete, it contin-
ues in other sporting federations.71 "Scientific and medical bodies
have also joined the protest, asking sports bodies, especially the Inter-
national Olympic Committee (IOC), to stop using chromosome test-
ing. They include the American Medical Association and the
67. SeeJohn Money, GAY STRAIGHT, AND IN-BETWEEN 28-29 (1988) (describing a list of
eight various criteria for determining sex).
68. For example, people undergoing transsexual surgery report that they have had a
life-long perception of their inner psychological selves which has been at odds with their
gender and has been ascribed to them through the reactions and definitions of others. On
the other hand, some people have a self-perception that is in accord with their genetic
make-up, but their appearance or behavior is at odds with some cultural norms of appear-
ance and behavior associated with their gender. In such cases, the authenticity of their self-
perception will be challenged. See, e.g., Jerold Taitz, Judicial Determination of the Sexual Iden-
tity of Post-Operative Transsexuals: A New Form of Sex Discrimination, 13 AM. J. LAw & MED. 53,
53 n.1 (1987).
69. See generally Albert de la Chapelle, The Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin Screening for
'Gender Verification'of Female Athletes, 256JAMA 1920 (1986); B. Dingeon et al., Sex Testing in
the Olympics, 358 NATURE 447 (1992); Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith & Elizabeth A. Ferris,
Gender Verification in Sport: The Need for Change? 25 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 17 (1991); Arne
Ljungqvist & Joe Leigh Simpson, Medical Examination for Health of All Athletes Replacing the
Need for Gender Verification in International Sports: The International Amateur Athletic Federation
Plan, 267 JAMA 850 (1992); Joe Leigh Simpson, Disorders of Gonads and Internal Reproductive
Ducts, in 2 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS 1593 (Alan E.H. Emery et al.,
eds. 1990); Darnelle M. Thompson et al., Routine Use of Hair Root or Buccal Swab Specimens for
PCR Analysis: Advantages Over Using Blood, 207 CLINICA CHIMiCA ACTA 169 (1992); A.
Yamaguchi et al., A Simple Method for Gender Verification Based on PCR Detection of Y-Chromo-
somal DNA and its Application at the Winter Universiade 1991 in Sapporo City, Japan, 13 INT'LJ.
SPORTS MED. 304 (1992).
70. See supra discussion accompanying notes 58-69.
71. See id.
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American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, respected bodies
that put pressure on the organizers of the 1996 Olympics in
Atlanta.
72
Political critiques of sports sex testing and its attachment to tradi-
tional notions of male and female capacities might have been viewed
as irrelevant had sex testing actually furthered a clear and compelling
policy goal. Unfortunately, it does not. Strength differentials do not
necessarily track genetic make-up more consistently than other fac-
tors. Training is by far the most significant determinant of success.73
Moreover, within the world of medicine and biology, there are non-
genetic factors that can outweigh the average advantage in strength
that is normally conveyed by mere presence of a normally operating Y
chromosome. For example, women who have taken steroidal hor-
mones cannot be detected by chromosome screening. They will, how-
ever, have a strength advantage over most of their untreated sisters
due to the drug's effect of enlarging their muscles.
Similarly, females with a condition called congenital adrenal hy-
perplasia 4 will pass the chromosome test with flying colors even
though the condition can make them unusually muscular. In this
common hereditary disorder, the adrenal glands of women with nor-
mal XX chromosomes produce an excess of male hormones, which
can lead to masculine traits, including ambiguous external genitalia
and masculine body proportions. Pseudo-hermaphrodites 75 and true
hermaphrodites, 76 people with rare conditions, display a range of phe-
notypes, from almost typically male to almost typically female. These
athletes, too, will usually pass undetected by chromosome screening.
Conversely, there are two abnormalities that would label phe-
notypical females as "male" if chromosome screening is done, but
which do not convey any atypical strength." People with Turner's
Syndrome are female in appearance and physical orientation, but are
short, and usually don't menstruate or conceive. 78 And one of the
72. See What Is a Man, What Has He Got? IRsH TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at 20.
73. See Roslyn Carbon, Female Athletes: ABC of Sports Medicine, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 254
(1994).
74. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY, Pediatrics and Genetics, §16.196,
2071 (15th ed., 1987).
75. "Female pseudohermaphrodites are normal females exposed to excessive amounts
of androgenic steroids in utero. They have 46,XX karyotypes and normal internal genita-
lia, but ambiguous external genitalia." Id. at § 16.187, 1962.
76. "True Hermaphrodites have both ovarian and testicular tissue, and mixed mascu-
line and feminine genital structures; a rare individual may be fully masculinized exter-
nally." Id.
77. See Page, supra note 12 at El.
78. See id.
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most common intersex states is androgen sensitivity, where phenotypi-
cal females have the same XY chromosome make-up as genetic males,
but don't respond to the male hormone testosterone. The result is a
person with breasts, a vagina, and a female sex life, and with no atypi-
cal strength or musculature.79
Men, meanwhile, have never been subjected to these tests, even
though they too can have genetic abnormalities that on paper make
them appear female. In Klinefelter's Syndrome and XX male syn-
drome, phenotypical men have two XX chromosomes; while their
genitalia may be atypically small, they will have male body build and
muscle strength. Though classified as XX males by genetic conven-
tion, such men would presumably pass the sports' world's chromo-
some tests, being viewed as females and thus eligible for women's
teams, despite the presumed advantages of male musculature.
But the problem is larger than the imperfection of using chromo-
some testing to ascertain sex; it is the difficulty in articulating a clear
rationale for the testing at all. Its purported purpose, which is to level
the playing field for women by having them compete only against wo-
men, ignores the very real variation in genetic coding for body type
among ordinary women. For example, those who are born with a
strong predisposition to greater than average height will have an ad-
vantage in a number of track and field events. Their sisters of average
height could surely complain that a failure to qualify as an Olympic
high-jumper has less to do with training, determination, and commit-
ment and more to do with one's fortune in inherited body type. The
training and other "character" factors only help to differentiate
among the already fortunate tall women.
Indeed, mixed attitudes about whether sporting events are about
celebrating excellence in outcome versus excellence in effort is evi-
dent in the multiple weight classes for boxing (which allows lighter
competitors to be appreciated for their skill and training) versus the
single class structure of basketball (which has never fronted a short-
persons' league) and most other sports. Without clarity about the
purpose of the sports spectacle, the credibility of humiliating and
often erroneous sex testing will be undone, as little purpose seems to
be served by resorting to such a problematic practice.8 °
The question of identifying people as men or women is also of
interest beyond the world of Olympic politics. Similar questions have
79. See id.
80. Similar questions arise in the context of debates over banning steroid use. See, e.g.,
Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin, FEELING GoOD AND DOING BETTER: ETHICS AND NONTHERA-
PEUTIC DRUG USE 107-126 (Thomas H. Murray, ed., 1984).
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arisen in legislative politics."1 For example, British Labour Party offi-
cials made an impromptu ruling in 1994 on whether a man who has a
sex change operation is a 'woman' and, if so, when she becomes one.
The party's interest was sparked when it was confirmed that up to fifty
Labour parliamentary candidates in winnable seats were to be chosen
from all-women short lists, opening up the vista of a legal challenge
over whether a candidate is, or is not, a woman. 2 As for transsexuals,
the questions can range from whether a phenotypic female raising a
child conceived with the phenotypic female's sperm should be treated
as the "mother" or the "father" of the child to whether birth certifi-
cates should be re-issued with a change of sex following transsexual
surgery. s3
The legal response in both situations would be made more credi-
ble if more attention were focused on why the distinction is needed
and less on the underlying genetic make-up of the individual. For the
Labour Party, the issue ought to be why there are all-women short lists
(e.g. to ensure women a spokesperson who understands their lives)
and whether the disputed individual can fulfill that purpose.
V. CATEGORY FOUR: ILLUSIONS OF BIOLOGICAL TRUTHS
The normative power of what is perceived to be an unshakeable
biological reality is brought home most forcefully when examining
classification systems that are political and cultural constructs which
attain persistent, unchallenged credibility due to the belief that they
are based instead on physical reality. The biological determinism that
underlay many 19th century notions of women's capabilities and roles
is one example. Racial classifications are another.8 4
A recent study found that when new racial categories were of-
fered in the early 1970s, thirty-four percent of people participating in
a census survey in two consecutive years changed racial groups from
81. See, e.g., Andy McSmith, New Labour Party Men Grapple with Sexual Identity, OBSERVER
(London) Oct. 9, 1994 at 13.
82. See id.
83. See generally Gail Brent, Some Legal Problems of the Post-Operative Transsexua 12J. FAM-
ILy L. 405 (1972-73); Justice Ormrod, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Sex Determination, 40
MEDICO-LEGALJ. 78 (1972). For cases concerning birth certificate alterations, see Van Oos-
terwijck v. Belgium, 3 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 557 (1981); Rees v. U.K., 7 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 429
(1985).
84. See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in
Race-Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construc-
tion of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1
(1994) (analyzing the definitions of race offered by a myriad of sources); Luther Wright,
Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of
Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REv. 513 (1995).
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one year to the next.8 5 Another documents how the race classification
assigned at birth may well be different from that assigned at death. 6
The next sea change could occur in the year 2000, depending on new
census rules allowing for persons to select more than one of the cur-
rent racial categories (white, black, American, Aleut, Asian/pacific is-
lander, Eskimo, and "other") to describe themselves.8 7
Despite a century of proof that race is a social and not a biologi-
cal category, it is still viewed as a matter of "blood."88 It has been used
as a tool to squelch criticism of the particular racial classification
schemes in place;89 to bolster theological and cultural beliefs that are
intertwined with race classification; and, most recently, to construct
arguments about the "immutability" of race as the foundation of a
85. See James Shreeve, Terms ofEstrangement, 15 DISCOVER 56, 57 (1994).
86. See Robert A. Hahn et al., Inconsistencies in Coding of Race and Ethnicity Between Birth
and Death in US Infants. A New Look at Infant Mortality, 1983 through 1985, 267 JAMA 259
(1992). The objective of this study was to ascertain the consistency of the racial and ethnic
classification of United States infants between birth and death and its impact on infant
mortality rates. See id. at 259 The subjects used were all "US infants born from 1983
through 1985 who died within a year." Id. The process utilized was the "national linked
birth/infant-death computer tape, augmented with information on infants' race and
ethnicity at death, to compare the coding of race and Hispanic ethnicity at birth and at
death." Id. The results showed an "inconsistency in the coding of race is low for whites
(1.2%), greater for blacks (4.3%), and greatest for races other than white or black
(43.2%). Most infants reclassified at death (87.3%) are classified as white at death." Id.
The study concluded that "the coding of race and ethnicity of infants at birth and death is
remarkably inconsistent .. " Id.
87. As of 1994, the Census Bureau utilized four specific racial categories in addition to
the generic "other" category: white, black, Asian-Pacific Islander, and American-Indian-
Alaskan native. See Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Urged to Reflect Wider Diversity in Racial and Ethnic
Classifications, N.Y. TiMEs, July 8, 1994, at A18. See also generally Robert A. Hahn, The State of
Federal Health Statistics on Racial and Ethnic Groups, 267 JAMA 259 (1992). See Trude Ben-
nett, "Racial" and Ethnic Classification: Two Steps Forward and One Step Back? 112 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 477 (1997) (describing current racial and ethnic classification policies of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)). Recommendations from the Interagency Commit-
tee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards to the Office of Management and
Budget Concerning Changes to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on
Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,873 (OMB 1997) (notice and request for comments)
(visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.wais.access.gpo.gov>.
88. See Ritchie Witzig, The Medicalization of Race: Scientific Legitimization of a Flawed Social
Construct, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 675 (1996).
The term "race" has many definitions, ranging from a family unit to a species, but
in common and medical usage, defining "race" has meant separating Homo sapi-
ens into three to six groups. This division of Homo sapiens into race taxons started
in the 18th century, when the sciences of genetics and evolutionary biology were
not yet invented. These disciplines have since shown that human race taxonomy
has no scientific basis. Race categories are social constructs, that is, concepts cre-
ated from prevailing social perceptions without scientific evidence.
Id. at 675 (emphasis in original).
89. See id at 676.
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policy prohibiting maltreatment of those whose race puts them at a
disadvantage through no "fault" of their own.90
Carolus Linnaeus, author of the 1758 founding document of tax-
onomy, the "Systema Naturae,"91 divided the worlds flora and fauna
into a series of branching categories that reflected apparent closeness
in physiology. Darwin's "Origin of Species," coupled with modem ge-
netics, led biologists to define "species" as groups of life forms that are
intra-fertile. But despite the fact that all members of a species can
breed together, not all do; geographic separation can lead some sub-
groups to breed within themselves more frequently than outside
themselves.
The result can be a concentration of whichever traits happen to
have been prevalent in the earliest sub-population. These sub-groups,
technically fertile with one another but in practice not occupying the
same gene pool, are called sub-species. In some animals, such as dogs
and cats, those interested in tracking physical characteristics often call
these sub-groups "breeds." This is the notion that underlies much of
the argument for a biological definition of "race."
Interestingly, racial clarifications were first proposed by Linnaeus
not as terms that reflected biological difference, but merely geo-
graphic clustering.92 It was Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-
1840), a German anatomist and naturalist, who proposed a human
taxonomy in which, while all peoples originated from a single com-
mon man, some groups - "races" - differed in characteristic ways
from the original aesthetic ideal.93 These races conveniently clustered
geographically, which was explained by noting that the differences un-
doubtedly arose due to adaptation to climate and diet as humans
spread over the globe.94 In this pre-genetic era, it was believed that
changes occurring in one's lifetime, such as darkening of skin in re-
sponse to sunlight, could eventually be passed on to children.
Modem geneticists thought that examining the frequency of ge-
netic markers would yield a more precise accounting of these races; it
did not. On average, there is only 0.2% difference in genetic material
between any two randomly chosen people.95 Further, when two ran-
dom individuals are chosen and one examines only the material that
90. See Ford, supra note 84, at 1239-41.
91. See Witzig, supra note 88, at 675; Gould, infra note 93, at 66-67.
92. See Witzig, supra note 88, at 675.
93. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Geometer of Race, 15 DISCOVER 65 (1994).
94. See id. See also Claude Bouchard Genetic Basis of Racial Differences, 13 CAN. J. SPORT
Sci. 104-08 (1988).
95. See Hoffman, infra note 96, at 4.
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differs between them, on average only six percent of it will be associ-
ated with which "race" the two people have been assigned.96 Another
nine percent will be associated with the individuals' respective nation-
alities, and eighty-five percent will not be associated with any variable
in particular.97 In other words, to the degree that individuals do dif-
fer genetically, racial classification will correlate with only a twelfth of
the difference.98 Likewise, the choice to classify people by color of
eye, hair, and skin, along with teeth, eye shape, and hair texture was in
part tautological - these were the features that appeared to vary most
in association with geography - and responds primarily to the in-
stinct to classify by what can be seen.99
Classifications could as easily, and more cleanly, be made by
blood type, antigen type, or fingerprint.l00 Fingerprints tend to fea-
ture loops, or whorls, or arches.' 1 Classifying humans this way would
yield a "loops" race consisting of most Europeans, black Africans, and
east Asians; a "whorls" race of Mongolians and Australian aborigines;
and an "arches" race of Khoisans, central Europeans and others. 0 2
But these groupings would not have coincided with the original
geopolitical bases for making racial classifications at all, and they
would undermine the notion of race by failing to accord with the pat-
tern of trait differentiation in facial features.10 3 Indeed, any attempt
to classify humans by more than one specific trait runs into the prob-
lem of concordance: while "Asian" may be characterized by particular
skin tones, eye shapes, and hair colors and textures, many Asians will
have the eyes typical of their assigned group but hair or skin tone
characteristic of another.10 4
While it is true that traits whose genes are located in adjacent
regions on the same chromosome will tend to travel together through
96. Paul Hoffman, The Science of Race, 15 DISCOVER 4 (1994).
97. See id.
98. See id. See also F.L. Jackson, Race and Ethnicity as Biological Constructs, 2 ETHNICITY
Dis. 120 (1992); Bouchard, supra note 94. Research shows that genetic variation in gene
products and in the non-coding sequence of DNA is quite extensive in humans. See
Bouchard, supra note 94, at 106. Variation is found more frequently in non-coding DNA
sequences than in coding exons, and while this variation does not influence the primary
structure of the proteins, it may have considerable impact on gene expression. See id.
However, much of that genetic variation is shared by all human beings, and only about
10% is specific to races or populations within races. See id.
99. See Diamond, infra note 100, at 87-89.
100. SeeJared Diamond, Race Without Color, 15 DISCOVER 83, 86 (1994).
101. See id. at 87.
102. See id
103. See supra discussion accompanying notes 93-102.
104. See id.
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the generations, the myriad deletions, substitutions, transpositions,
and mutations that occur during reproduction guarantees that the
traits ultimately will remain independent of one another. °5
The closest thing we can find to a clean, "objective" measure of
diversity is genetic distinctness. By this measure, Khoisans of South-
ern Africa would be one race; other sub-Saharan Africans would form
several distinct races, and the entire remainder of the world's popula-
tion - European, Asian, American, etc - would belong to one
race.106 Consider the geographic, technological, and social histories
of these groups, and one quickly realizes that this formulation is a
measure of reproductive isolation, and nothing more.
Nonetheless, there is an enduring myth of a biological basis for
racial classifications, and it is this myth that has strengthened the argu-
ments for a "natural" or "god given" separation of humans. This has
been the basis for religious teachings and social policy for so long that
it is nearly impossible to penetrate pervasive misunderstanding with
actual facts. Indeed, even when we appear to be breaking through the
myth, for example by offering a box labeled "multiracial" for those
who view themselves or are viewed by others as having "mixed" parent-
age, we nonetheless reinforce the notion that the parents, or grand-
parents, were a "pure" white, or black, or yellow, or red. No such
phenomenon exists.
While race undoubtedly exists as a social classification, sometimes
welcomed, more often resented, it is hardly a biological distinction.
Nonetheless, the race-based social classifications, which might other-
wise break down under the pressure of competing classifications
based on geography, language, religion, wealth, or system of moral
philosophy, have endured by pointing to this faux-biology and pro-
claiming an objectivity and inevitability to eye/hair/skin color
categorizations.
Thus, the mere belief that there is a clear unshakeable biological
definition can defeat generations of scholars who write about why
there is little that is clear, unshakeable, or unrelated to political or
social goals. Since biological realities are often mistaken for a divine
or natural blueprint of the social world, challenging what appears to
be writ in physiology will often be received with outrage, humor, in-
105. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Health and Environmental Research To
Know Ourselves: Introducing the Human Genome (describing basic genetic terminology, the
human genome research project, and its history) (last visited June 29, 1998) <http://
www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human-Genome/tko/03_introducing.html>.
106. See generally, Diamond, supra note 100-02 and accompanying text.
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credulity, or dismissiveness; rarely will it be received with comprehen-
sion and acceptance.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the advent of the genetic era, our understanding of biology
is ever deepening. With this comes the temptation to deepen our reli-
ance on biology as well. This could well be a mistake.
Whether in theology or in philosophy, law has long looked
outside itself for a set of constraints on legal imagination and rule
making. It has also looked to the natural world, finding there the
seeming simplicity of unambiguous and unchangeable truths, such as
who is alive and who is dead, who is a mother and who is a father, who
is a man and who is a woman, and even, who is black and who is white.
Alas, these biological truths are neither unambiguous nor un-
changeable. Indeed, at times, they are no truth at all. But law uses
them, nonetheless, and even erects fictions in the forms of presump-
tions of fact and of law, in order to reorder the world of social rela-
tionships into one that seems to reflect the world of biological
relationships.
What would happen if law were to continue to do this in the un-
reflective fashion it has pursued until now? As genetic findings in-
crease in number, so too will the possibilities for legal classifications
that attempt to track these developments. Researchers have been
publishing hints of a biological factor in the development of human
homosexuality since the early 1990s.1°7 If a confirmed, genetic influ-
ence were to be identified, how would that further legal treatment of
the phenomenon of homosexuality? Would the population of those
engaged in homosexual acts be divided into "true" homosexuals (i.e.,
those with the genetic predisposition), and "pseudo" homosexuals?
Would the legal tolerance of these acts depend upon whether the in-
dividuals were true homosexuals only acting true to the "genetic na-
ture" versus pseudo homosexuals acting out of a perverse desire to
defy societal norms of heterosexuality?
A child needs protection. The law is there to identify the adults
who will provide it. Biology may tell us who birthed the child, and
whose egg provided the maternal DNA. But this is neither necessary
nor sufficient to determine whom the law should call a mother. A
person may have a Y chromosome, but this is neither necessary nor
107. See, e.g. D.F. Swaab & M.A. Hofman, An Enlarged Suprachiasmatic Nucleus in Homosex-
ual Men, 537 BRAIN RESEARCH 141 (1990); Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Struc-
ture Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034 (1991).
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sufficient to determine if this person should compete on a "men's"
team in the Olympics. And a permanently comatose member of the
species Homo sapiens may be alive at the cellular and physiological
level, but to grant human rights may be pointless. While law may find
biology one useful factor in its classification of persons and their
rights, it cannot afford to ignore the purposes for which those rights
and rules are created.
For each opportunity to import biological categories into law, it is
essential to ask: Why? What social purpose is to be furthered, and
does reliance in biological definitions serve that purpose? If not, does
reliance on biological categories offer such advantages in terms of ad-
ministrative simplicity or added public credibility that it justifies the
confusion, indeed unfairness, it often creates in marginal cases? The
rules of morality and social regulation cannot be found in our genes;
all we will find there are amino acids.
